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Process Hazard Analysis Facilitator - Ask me anything!

  • 1.  Process Hazard Analysis Facilitator - Ask me anything!

    SENIOR MEMBER
    Posted 11-27-2018 00:49
    Hello,

    I am a process safety consultant specializing in process hazard analysis facilitation (HAZOP, LOPA, FMEA).  I work for Fortune 500 Chemical Processing and Oil & Gas Companies.

    Ask me anything!

    Thanks,
    Michael Saura exidaFSP
    My website: www.saltegra.com


  • 2.  RE: Process Hazard Analysis Facilitator - Ask me anything!

    Posted 11-28-2018 00:43
    Hello,
    How would you connect RBPS improvement to PHA Revalidation.

    ------------------------------
    Mazharuddin Shaikh CFSP
    SAFETY ENGINEER
    Kuwait Oil Company
    Kuwait
    ------------------------------



  • 3.  RE: Process Hazard Analysis Facilitator - Ask me anything!

    SENIOR MEMBER
    Posted 11-28-2018 01:20
    Hello Mazharuddin,

    Thanks for asking - PHA Revalidation or Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis is one of the elements of RBPS or risk-based process safety (I assume this is what you meant).

    In the US industrial facilities with covered processes under OSHA PSM requires that PHAs are revalidated (29 CFR 1910.119(e)(6)):
    - at least every 5 years
    - if there are any major changes to the unit (typically as a part of a Management of Change activity)

    PHA Revalidations are completed to:
    - ensure that PHAs are current and reflects the latest operating conditions of the covered processes.
    - verify if the process does not repeat any new industry incidents, and should also be considered if the process PHA being revalidated is similar to the incident
    - perhaps the company's risk tolerance has changed, or guidance/standards were updated, which may affect the current risk assessment

    PHA Revalidations can also check/verify the following if there were any process/design changes:
    - operating procedures (i.e. updated procedures needed for new operating conditions or new equipment)
    - process safety information (i.e. does the P&ID affect all MOCs within the past 5 years)
    - mechanical integrity (i.e. are maintenance frequencies and inspection strategies still the same)
    - training for personnel (i.e. personnel needs to be trained if operating procedures were updated)

    Sometimes, MOCs are done incorrectly such that new potential hazards are introduced or existing hazards are made worse; therefore potentially exposing the unit to increased risk or unmitigated risk.

    This is why PHA Revalidations are very important! I hope I was able to answers your question.


    ------------------------------
    Michael Saura exidaFSP
    Founder
    SALTEGRA Consulting LLC

    ------------------------------



  • 4.  RE: Process Hazard Analysis Facilitator - Ask me anything!

    Posted 11-29-2018 03:21
    The Process Hazards Analysis (PHA) Study is a qualitative study which is a key component for implementation of   Risk Based Process Safety Management.
     

    The PHA Study is a systematic and comprehensive review of a process or change to:

    • Identify and understand hazards associated with a process or change;
    • Analyze the significance of the hazards;
    • Assess the adequacy of the safeguards; and
    • Develop recommendations to mitigate the hazards where justified.
    A PHA study may use a number of possible methodologies such as a Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) review or a What If/Checklist review.

    The purpose of a PHA Study is to evaluate the potential risks to human health and safety, the environment and certain asset risks, based upon the information available.  The PHA Study is used to:

    • Logically and consistently evaluate risks;
    • Obtain a preliminary understanding of these risks; and
    • Determine areas where initial risk reduction should be considered.

    All processes that require a qualitative risk assessment (PHA) as identified through  Procedures should be periodically revalidated on an established frequency in accordance with applicable regulations and procedures.
    Methodology: 

       What If / Checklist Study Procedure

    The what-if technique is a systematic method for examining the response of a process system to equipment failures, operator errors and off-normal process conditions. The team uses the what-if analysis technique to brainstorm the various types of accidents and deviations from normal operation that can occur within the process.

    For example: What if the pump stops?

    During brainstorming of what-if questions, the team focuses on initiating causes/events rather than consequences.

    The specific steps of the What If / Checklist Study methodology used in the assessment are:

    • Select section or node to be considered
    • Describe the design intention of the section
    • Brainstorm to identify concerns
    • Review the standard checklists for additional potential concerns
    • Select a valid concern
    • Identify consequences
    • Identify existing and verifiable safeguards
    • Risk rank the concern
    • Develop recommendations to address actionable risks or where necessary to ensure management of risk is consistent.
    • Continue the process until all concerns in a section have been evaluated and all sections of the workshop have been completed
    • Review global concerns and other issues during the wrap up session and verify study is complete.

        HAZOP Procedure

    The HAZOP methodology uses deviation guidewords to systematically focus the team on the identification of process deviations that can lead to undesirable consequences. The guidewords, (i.e., No, More, Less) in conjunction with key process parameters, (i.e., Flow, Level, Pressure) are used to prompt the study team to brainstorm possible causes of deviations (i.e., No Flow, More Level, Less Pressure) from design operation.

    The specific steps of the HAZOP Study methodology used in the assessment are:

    • Select the node or line to be considered
    • Describe the design intention of the node
    • Select a deviation guideword (e.g. No flow)
    • Identify valid causes of initiating events
    • Select a valid cause
    • Identify consequences
    • Identify existing and verifiable safeguards
    • Risk rank the concern
    • Develop recommendations to address actionable risks or where necessary to ensure management of risk is consistent.
    • Continue the process until all standard deviation guidewords have been applied to the node and any relevant additional guidewords.
    • Continue until all nodes identified for the workshop have been completed
    • Review global concerns and other issues during the wrap up session and verify study is complete.

    MOC Risk Prioritization for PHA Revalidation:

    MOC Risk Prioritization is key for PHA Re validation and MOC applicability to the relevent PHA process i.e. HAZOP, WHAT IF, SIL, C&E shall be established and such relevent study shall be revalidated as per MOC risk prioritization.

    ------------------------------
    Venkata SP Tata,
    Lead HSE Engineer, WorleyParsons,
    Room #11, EF-1761 Project Site Office, North Kuwait,
    Office: Al-Tameer Bldg, P.O. Box 9912 Ahmadi 61008 Kuwait
    T: +965 22083034 M: +965 66854269| GMT + 3
    ------------------------------



  • 5.  RE: Process Hazard Analysis Facilitator - Ask me anything!

    SENIOR MEMBER
    Posted 11-29-2018 11:28
    Tata - Thanks for the detailed information.

    Since you have no questions for me, I have one for you.

    What is (are) the most common scenario(s) that you find is (are) usually lacking in safeguards or IPL, in the PHAs you have performed?

    ------------------------------
    Michael Saura exidaFSP
    Founder
    SALTEGRA Consulting LLC
    ------------------------------



  • 6.  RE: Process Hazard Analysis Facilitator - Ask me anything!

    Posted 12-01-2018 01:11
    Hi Michael,

      Identify all Independent Protection Layers (IPLs)

    An IPL is a device, system, or action that is capable of preventing a scenario from proceeding to its undesired consequence independent of the initiating event or the action of any other layer of protection associated with the scenario. 

    To determine whether or not a safeguard qualifies as an IPL, consider the "3 D's" and the independence as follows:

    • An IPL must have the following "3 D's":
      • Detect - be able to sense a condition or problem,
      • Decide - whether an action or intervention is necessary or not,
      • Deflect - if action is required; the action must be capable of preventing the consequence in a timely manner.
    • An IPL must be independent of the initiating cause and of other IPL's

    After identifying the cause, consequences, and safeguards for a hazardous scenario determine which safeguards qualify as IPLs.  The identified safeguards must pass all four characteristics in order to qualify as IPLs: Specificity, Independence, Dependability and Auditability.   These characteristics are defined as:

    • Specificity: An IPL is designed solely to prevent or to mitigate the consequences of one potentially hazardous event (e.g., a runaway reaction, release of toxic material, a loss of containment, or a fire). Multiple causes may lead to the same hazardous event, and therefore multiple event scenarios may initiate action of one IPL.
    • Independence: An IPL is independent of the other protection layers associated with the identified danger.
    • Dependability: It can be counted on to do what it was designed to do. Both random and systematic failure modes are addressed in the design.
    • Auditability: It is designed to facilitate regular validation of the protective functions. Functional testing and maintenance of the safety system is necessary.
    Scenarios will be ever changing and linked to kind of process system that we were focusing on. Let me explain you taking a OIL and Gas production process of OIL Train where Actionable Risks are linked to Flamable gas, Hazardous gas, inert gas or asphyxiants, oils and HCs, Condensates and HCs, Hazardous liquids or chemicals, aqueous mixtures, emissions, Operating temperaturs, and Radiation.

    Now let us see the top events or condition of concern from the above which requires effective safe guards to prevent possible top events.  Loss of Containment -rupture, Loss of Containment - Leak,O2 Deviation-Asphyxiation, Tube failure, Loss of containment in flare systems, fuel gas system, drain system, Operation outside design parameters, contact with hot surfaces, flaring and exhaust systems.

    While conducting a PHA for a newly built facility prior to its start up or for an running facility to revalidate, PHA faciliatator shall take all the different studies that were conducted during the Feed, Design, Construction and commissioning phases as well as MOC's that were implemented during operation.

    In simple PHA = (HAZOP+ HAZID +, SIL+, RAM+ C&E etc.)  Some company's use IHAZID Study (Integrated Hazard Identification Study) u technique for conducting a detailed PHA.
    While carrying out a PHA it is important that the team shall validate safeguards by challenging them in full asbelow

    • Operating procedures are written, up-to-date, understood, and followed
    • Alarms and shutdowns are tested as necessary to ensure reliability.
    • Operators are trained in the duties of their area, both initial and refresher training.
    • Vehicular traffic is limited through plant. Lines a routed and equipment located such that potential for vehicle impact to piping and equipment is minimized.
    • Equipment is fit for its intended use (verify relief and drainage systems for existing plants).
    • Emergency response plans are written and communicated to all employees, including contractors. Evacuation signals are known and evacuation routes established.  Hypothetical drills are held as appropriate.
    • Piping and instrument diagrams reflect actual field conditions
    • Fire protection and mitigation equipment is installed, adequately sized, functional, and tested on suitable frequency.
    • Fire department or brigade is trained, and has sufficient equipment available. Flare monitors, pumps, etc. are located appropriately.
    • Electrical area classification is understood and followed.
    • Maintenance procedures are written, up-to-date, understood and followed. Work permit system is in place and followed.  Hot work, vessel entry, and other work permit procedures are in place and followed.
    • Inspection procedures and training are appropriate for the equipment under review.


    Regards




    ------------------------------
    Venkata SP Tata,
    Lead HSE Engineer, WorleyParsons,
    Room #11, EF-1761 Project Site Office, North Kuwait,
    Office: Al-Tameer Bldg, P.O. Box 9912 Ahmadi 61008 Kuwait
    T: +965 22083034 M: +965 66854269| GMT + 3
    ------------------------------



  • 7.  RE: Process Hazard Analysis Facilitator - Ask me anything!

    SENIOR MEMBER
    Posted 12-22-2018 00:30
    Hi michael. As a process safety engineer, i have seen that people actually take safeguards as IPLs without considering the ground rules of IPL. Also I have seen the scenarios, where for flanhe gakset leaks not because of process upset but due to corrosion or erosion, there are no IPLs but mostly administrative safeguards.

    Would love to hear your view on this.

    Also i have seen that there are some scenarios like external events viz. Runaway reaction where people seem to have an ipl, but those actually are many times lacking auditability and effectiveness.

    I would also love to hear from you on this.











    ------------------------------
    Sushant Chaturvedi BE
    Process Safety Engineer
    Reliance Industries Ltd
    Ahmedabad
    ------------------------------



  • 8.  RE: Process Hazard Analysis Facilitator - Ask me anything!

    SENIOR MEMBER
    Posted 12-22-2018 01:17
    Hello Sushant,

    These are very good discussion points:

    - Ground rules are very well written in the CCPS blue book for IPLs and Initiating Events. At the very least IPLs should be reviewed against this, and verify with the team 

    - While LOPA can be a powerful tool, corrosion based scenarios have been a subject of contention and so care should be taken. However there are guidance on the initiating event likelihood of leaks/rupture. 

    - In terms of consequence due to corrosion, it's a different story. Typically the aspect of time comes into play, and it's hard to predict the time the hazard (e.g. leak/loss of containment) will manifest if caused by a certain damage mechanism. A separate study should be completed for damage mechanism based scenarios. In California for example, refineries are now required to complete a Damage Mechanism Review (DMR) which is an extension of the PHA, but does not involve LOPA. Federal OSHA in the US may be adopting this soon as well.
    What this is verifying if the facility is aware of the possible damage mechanisms (usually by completing a corrosion study) in their processes, and that proper inspection and maintenance strategies are in place based on Risk Based Inspection. 

    - Runaway reactions have been a part of LOPAs. It's fast (acute) and IPLs and modifiers can be limited. Therefore these scenarios are known to utilize safety instrumented functions (SIF) depending on the residual risk post LOPA. 

    Can you share what type of process this runaway reaction happens in your experience?

    Michael





  • 9.  RE: Process Hazard Analysis Facilitator - Ask me anything!

    SENIOR MEMBER
    Posted 12-22-2018 02:12
    Michael

    Typically hydrotreating and hydroprocessing reactions are known for runaway if the quench media is lost. The problem is that the business demand affects verification of depressurizing rates and opening time of depressurizng valves as these would call for plant shutdown.

    Also i have seen very loose views on considering human response as IPL esp. when initiating event is human error.

    Could you share some document on DMR. is it based on API code?

    ------------------------------
    Sushant Chaturvedi BE
    Process Safety Engineer
    Reliance Industries Ltd
    Ahmedabad
    ------------------------------



  • 10.  RE: Process Hazard Analysis Facilitator - Ask me anything!

    SENIOR MEMBER
    Posted 12-22-2018 04:05
    Sushanti,
    I apologize, my question wasn't clear. I meant to ask you which unit you deal with in your facility that was prone to runaway (I wasn't sure whether you were in refining or another type of facility). 
    You are correct, hydrocracking and hydrotreating are notorious of a runaway reaction, which I have facilitated plenty times so we are on the same page.
    In general, and in refineries I have worked with, it is now becoming normal to shut down the refinery if there is a runaway reaction (or telltale sign of), the way spurious trips and unwanted business losses are avoided is to provide a robust voting logic, usually multiple transmitters on each bed. Hydrocrackers typically use 100# and 300# emergency depressurization systems. You could say that it removes the blame game when manual depressurization is required, rather than auto-depressure. 
    As for DMR, it is a regulatory requirement in California. You could say that it is based on API 571. Here is the link to the regulations: CalOSHA PSM Standard (Refining)


    ------------------------------
    Michael Saura exidaFSP
    Founder
    SALTEGRA Consulting LLC
    ------------------------------



  • 11.  RE: Process Hazard Analysis Facilitator - Ask me anything!

    Posted 11-28-2018 16:26
    A fence can provide separation distance and thus improves safety

    How does one calculate the SIL rating of a fence?

    --
    Best Regards....
    John Westover (BSChE - Ariz, M Eng Sci - Monash) CEng FIChemE AAIChE
    Chairman and Managing Director, John Westover Pty Ltd
    Phone inside Australia 04-2348-9955
    Phone outside Australia +61-4-2348-9955

    Please visit our website at www.process-engineers.com

    ABN 53 133 399 783

    Profile: (http://au.linkedin.com/in/johnwestover)





  • 12.  RE: Process Hazard Analysis Facilitator - Ask me anything!

    SENIOR MEMBER
    Posted 11-28-2018 17:01
    SIL Rating applies to instrumented fuction that complies with IEC 61511, 61508 and ISA-S84.01, and therefore is called a Safety Instrumented Function (SIF) which can be a part of a Safety Instrumented System (SIS)​.

    A fence is not an instrumented function and therefore cannot be assigned a SIL Rating. However, a fence can be a form of passive safeguard that can reduce occupancy (probability of personnel presence), which is a conditional modifier.

    I hope this answers your question.

    ------------------------------
    Michael Saura exidaFSP
    Founder
    SALTEGRA Consulting LLC
    ------------------------------



  • 13.  RE: Process Hazard Analysis Facilitator - Ask me anything!

    Posted 12-02-2018 01:18
    It does and does not answer my question

    A fence can be a reasonable alternative to a SIS. Unless there is a standardised method to do this calculation, many cost effective options will be missed. And because a fence is not a recognised quantifiable safety system, the ability to use something like a fence to reduce an insurance premium is compromised. 

    I applaud the global collection of instrumentation engineers for standardising safety calculations for instrumentation - it is an amazing accomplishment - but it is limited only to instrumentation, and that is the flaw.

    I am hoping someone (person or company) can develop a method that allows safety non-instrumented systems (SNIS) to be compared in exactly the same way as SIS.

    Thank you for letting me vent.

    --
    Best Regards....
    John Westover (BSChE - Ariz, M Eng Sci - Monash) CEng FIChemE AAIChE
    Chairman and Managing Director, John Westover Pty Ltd
    Phone inside Australia 04-2348-9955
    Phone outside Australia +61-4-2348-9955

    Please visit our website at www.process-engineers.com

    ABN 53 133 399 783

    Profile: (http://au.linkedin.com/in/johnwestover)





  • 14.  RE: Process Hazard Analysis Facilitator - Ask me anything!

    SENIOR MEMBER
    Posted 12-02-2018 02:27
    Thoughts like this makes this thread interesting. Feel free to vent so long as it is related to Hazard and Risk Analysis and is in line with the conversation. Haha.

    I'm curious about the part where I did not answer your question.

    If you were looking for a way to apply a SIL rating to a fence, then yes, no standards exist.

    However, the LOPA Methodology allows credit for occupancy. I would be cautious though when crediting this, making sure it complies with occupancy rules of CCPS and/or your companies corporate standards. Some companies don't allow occupancy, and that's fine if applied consistently.

    If the initiating event is human initiated, then Initiating event likelihood (IEL) can be reduced, but care about double dipping with occupancy should be taken.

    Long story short, you can credit a maximun 100 RRF for occupancy or for the IEL. That still risk reduced. It's just not an IPL.

    Now it's a different story if we are talking about fence with sensors that can trip the equipment of concern. (Usually applicable with collab robots). Topic for a diff time.









    ------------------------------
    Michael Saura exidaFSP
    Founder
    SALTEGRA Consulting LLC
    www.saltegra.com
    ------------------------------



  • 15.  RE: Process Hazard Analysis Facilitator - Ask me anything!

    Posted 12-04-2018 04:46
    Your second response is much more in depth than the first and therefore strongly preferred. The second response provides the basis for finding a way to objectively evaluate installing a SIS or a fence (or a hybrid - your robot activated fence hybrid sounds cool).

    Thanks for the feedback, and thanks for starting this thread.

    ------------------------------
    John Westover
    Managing Director
    John Westover Pty Ltd
    Northcote
    ------------------------------



  • 16.  RE: Process Hazard Analysis Facilitator - Ask me anything!

    SENIOR MEMBER
    Posted 12-04-2018 19:17
    Happy to help. Feel free to ask.

    ------------------------------
    Michael Saura exidaFSP
    Founder
    SALTEGRA Consulting LLC
    ------------------------------



  • 17.  RE: Process Hazard Analysis Facilitator - Ask me anything!

    SENIOR MEMBER
    Posted 12-06-2018 09:16
    Hello all,

    One thing to keep in mind when taking credit for conditional modifiers or enabling conditions is that these should be managed in the same way as IPLs. That is that they should be maintained, tested, audited, personnel trained, etc. For example, if a fence is installed to limit occupancy and credit is taken in the LOPA, there should be ongoing maintenance of the fence and associated signs, and there should be periodic verification that occupancy is actually limited as intended.

    One other factor to consider when using occupancy in LOPA is whether occupancy is truly limited at the time of the initiating event. Many times, occupancy is generally low in an area, but when a problem occurs, people head to the area for troubleshooting, repair, and/or emergency response thus making the occupancy limitation immaterial.

    Thoughts? Enjoying this discussion.

    Best regards,

    ------------------------------
    Jean Cronin
    Retired
    Cabot Corporation
    Midland MI
    ------------------------------



  • 18.  RE: Process Hazard Analysis Facilitator - Ask me anything!

    SENIOR MEMBER
    Posted 12-07-2018 00:17
    Hello Jean,

    Good points.

    In regards to occupancy being affected by operations response to an event; what I have seen done by my clients is that they ensure that specific written procedures (that are of course reviewed periodically and operators are periodically trained), states not to go to the incident first. A good example of this is for fired heater tube rupture cases; the procedure needs to state for operators to avoid directly going to the heater's firebox or immediate area.

    Keep the questions coming folks! This is an AMA (ask me anything) anyway!

    ------------------------------
    Michael Saura exidaFSP
    Founder
    SALTEGRA Consulting LLC
    ------------------------------



  • 19.  RE: Process Hazard Analysis Facilitator - Ask me anything!

    SENIOR MEMBER
    Posted 12-08-2018 07:24
    Thank you, Michael, for the interesting discussion,

    As far as I know, there are many cases filled by labors authorities against clients or personnel responsible for operating firms with poorly safety requirements. I witness an accident where was one employee got an electric shock and died and there are many severe injuries in different cases. I would like to request brief guidelines and advises to be followed in order to protect our self as any operative personnel from being sued.
    What about the safety documents such as (methods statement, work permit, and risk assessment), are these documents legally satisfy the basic safety requirements.?

    Best Regards,







    ------------------------------
    Ismail Abudoros
    Plant Manager
    Olympic Ice Production& Sweet Water S.P.C
    Hidd
    ------------------------------



  • 20.  RE: Process Hazard Analysis Facilitator - Ask me anything!

    SENIOR MEMBER
    Posted 12-08-2018 10:50
    Ismail,

    Thanks for the feedback.

    It is important to note that information here is not legal advice and therefore please seek legal help as necessary. These are opinions based on experience and inudstry known standards.

    Having said that, I cannot ascertain you that there will be a way for you from being sued. We live in a very litigous society and therefore there is always that possibility.

    However, from a safety standpoint, if we do what we can to prevent injuries in the plant, then the chance of being sued is reduced. And this can be done by complying with your country/state/province (etc) safety management regulations AND engineering standards and best practices to the best of your company's knowledge.

    I cannot give you guidelines as I do not know the details of your operation. Feel free to private message me here or in Linkedin.


    ------------------------------
    Michael Saura exidaFSP
    Founder
    SALTEGRA Consulting LLC
    Anaheim CA, USA
    ------------------------------



  • 21.  RE: Process Hazard Analysis Facilitator - Ask me anything!

    Posted 12-08-2018 08:25
    Hi Jean and Michael,

    Good Points. Occupany being affected by operations response will fall under HUMAN FACTORS which shall be considered as one of the Guidewords for PHA. Still I doubt about its considerations in studies by all but some state of art companies do consider them.

    For Example Human error prone environments e.g. poor lighting, awkward location of equipment , etc will lead to Acute safety and chronic health effects (e.g. slips, trips, falls, RSI).  Risk exposure for consideration is Occupational injury-prone environments and activities, human-machine interface design, control room layout and environment.  The Studies that would be effective for control would be Alarm objective analysis &
    Human factors analysis through which project shall consider Equipment layout and spacing, Equipment access, Safety in Designs Standards, Lighting plans and designs.

    Another Human factor to be considered shall be Undesirable outside human intervention e.g. piracy, sabotage, assault, terrorism, shooting, etc. which has dire consequences like Loss containment and acute safety and chronic health effects. Risk Exposure Evaluation shall aim to
     Facility-related HES vulnerabilities relative to geo-political or criminal activities Personnel-related safety and health vulnerabilities relative to geo-political or criminal activities, including chronic health impacts. Some of the studies that will address this are Threat Assessment and secuirty Assessment

    Regards






    ------------------------------
    Venkata SP Tata,
    Lead HSE Engineer, WorleyParsons,
    Room #11, EF-1761 Project Site Office, North Kuwait,
    Office: Al-Tameer Bldg, P.O. Box 9912 Ahmadi 61008 Kuwait
    T: +965 22083034 M: +965 66854269| GMT + 3
    ------------------------------



  • 22.  RE: Process Hazard Analysis Facilitator - Ask me anything!

    SENIOR MEMBER
    Posted 12-08-2018 10:53
    Tata,

    Thanks for the info.

    Michael

    ------------------------------
    Michael Saura exidaFSP
    Founder
    SALTEGRA Consulting LLC
    Anaheim CA
    ------------------------------



  • 23.  RE: Process Hazard Analysis Facilitator - Ask me anything!

    LIFE MEMBER
    Posted 12-08-2018 21:32
    I am writing to correct some factual errors in Post #17 in this thread as it relates to US regulatory requirements:

    1. "​Occupany being affected by operations response will fall under HUMAN FACTORS which shall be considered as one of the Guidewords for PHA." The word ​shall is false.  There is absolutely no requirement that human factors be considered as a HAZOP guideword.  Many use a human factors checklist.  Furthermore, occupancy is most often considered in the facility siting analysis, so  occupancy does not necessarily fall under human factors.

    2. "Human error prone environments ... will lead to Acute safety and chronic health effects (e.g. slips, trips, falls, RSI)." True, but slip/fall/RSI injuries are NOT the focus of human factors in PHAs.  The OSHA compliance directive lists several human factors topics (e.g., human machine interface, workload) that might result in PROCESS upsets.

    3. "Another Human factor to be considered shall be Undesirable outside human intervention e.g. piracy, sabotage, assault, terrorism, shooting, etc." Absolutely FALSE!!!  PHAs are only required to consider accidental human errors.  There is a different type of analysis, and a different mindset, required to analyze adversary threats.  For example, an insider adversary could close the inlet block valve under a pressure relief valve and totally defeat its claimed pressure safety benefit in a HAZOP or LOPA analysis.  Most people consider adversary threats in a separate security vulnerability analysis, NOT a PHA.

    ------------------------------
    Donald Lorenzo PE (ret.)
    Knoxville TN
    ------------------------------



  • 24.  RE: Process Hazard Analysis Facilitator - Ask me anything!

    Posted 12-11-2018 00:06
    Hi Donald. Your comment about 
    I am writing to correct some factual errors in Post #17 in this thread as it relates to US regulatory requirements:...

    Here in southeastern Australia (state of Victoria), we use the safety case methodology for managing major hazardous facilities. Safety case requires the owner to demonstrate the facility is safe, else they do not get a licence to operate.

    I agree with your comment, but as the AIChE is a global organisation, we need to ensure all corners of the planet are heard :)

    ------------------------------
    John Westover
    Managing Director
    John Westover Pty Ltd
    Northcote
    ------------------------------



  • 25.  RE: Process Hazard Analysis Facilitator - Ask me anything!

    SENIOR MEMBER
    Posted 12-11-2018 00:23
    You are quick sir! Thanks for replying to this.

    ------------------------------
    Michael Saura exidaFSP
    Founder
    SALTEGRA Consulting LLC
    ------------------------------



  • 26.  RE: Process Hazard Analysis Facilitator - Ask me anything!

    SENIOR MEMBER
    Posted 12-11-2018 00:22
    Donald,

    Good clarification. I believe the use of shall/should may be misappropriated and not intended on his end to state that these are "must do's or regulatory requirements". It would depend on the country's federal and local requirements.

    Thanks,
    Michael


    ------------------------------
    Michael Saura exidaFSP
    Founder
    SALTEGRA Consulting LLC
    ------------------------------



  • 27.  RE: Process Hazard Analysis Facilitator - Ask me anything!

    SENIOR MEMBER
    Posted 12-09-2018 05:14
    Dear Mr.Micheal,
    Can you please let me know your option for the following:
    We have a furnace oil fired heater which heats the oil (therminol 66).
    1. What care is to be taken as soon as leak is identified from the coil?
    2. Last time when there was a white smoke from heater, immediately heater was stopped, isolated and hydrotested with oil . But no leak was identified. Do you have any other suggestions for identification of leak?
    3. Can we use CAF gaskets for furnace oil line flanges (operating pressure is 1.8 ksc) ? Similarly for isolation  (Gate) valves body flanges are having CAF gaskets. Is it o.k? Which type of design/standards are to be used for isolation valves ?
    Regards
    RAMA KOTTI

    ------------------------------
    KOTTI KUMAR
    GENERAL MANAGER PRODUCTION
    INDO GERMAN PETROCHEMICALS LIMITED
    ------------------------------



  • 28.  RE: Process Hazard Analysis Facilitator - Ask me anything!

    SENIOR MEMBER
    Posted 12-11-2018 01:27
    Hello Rama,

    In the interest of maintaining discussions within this topic, I'd like to suggest you ask this question in a separate post, as appropriate.

    I am not a gas-fired heater expert. However, here is what I have from experience:

    1. As soon as the leak is identified from the coil, it is necessary that no personnel is sent to the hazard zone (your procedure should say this, and operators need to be trained about this). Typically the course of action is to trip the fired heater (by isolating fuel sources positively) and steaming the firebox. Depending on your process condition, specifically your pressure (if operating at high pressures). You may not have sufficient time to respond to a leak, therefore a trip may be necessary. Usually, standards provide guidance on this issue.

    2. How often are the coils and gaskets inspected? (e.g. thickness, IR monitoring). I can't say for certain what happened, and if really was a leak, but my guess is likely burner issues. Coked burners, draft issues (i.e. dampener issues or FD/ID blower issues), overfiring. For leaks, this boils down to your inspection and maintenance strategies for your gas-fired heater.

    3. I would refer to standards such as ISO 13705 and API 560 in regards to isolation systems.

    Thanks,
    Michael




    ------------------------------
    Michael Saura exidaFSP
    Founder
    SALTEGRA Consulting LLC
    ------------------------------



  • 29.  RE: Process Hazard Analysis Facilitator - Ask me anything!

    SENIOR MEMBER
    Posted 01-05-2019 23:14
    Hello everyone,

    In the spirit of PHA and Engineering, I have written an article that may help PHA Participants prepare for their upcoming PHA. Please check THIS

    Feel free to ask about any of the topics or provide yout own tips!

    Thanks,

    ------------------------------
    Michael Saura exidaFSP
    Founder
    SALTEGRA Consulting LLC
    ------------------------------



  • 30.  RE: Process Hazard Analysis Facilitator - Ask me anything!

    SENIOR MEMBER
    Posted 01-16-2019 12:30
    Hi Michael

    In Acid gas removal unit with MDEA solution, could you clarify the following:

    1. Is MDEA considered as non combustible?

    2. Hydrocarbons are absorbed by MDEA in the absorber and its presence can be seen in flash vessel.  Considering the above, is pool fire scenario valid for absorber?


    Thanks


    Ganesan

    ------------------------------
    Ganesan Balaji
    Manager
    TC
    Beaumont TX
    ------------------------------



  • 31.  RE: Process Hazard Analysis Facilitator - Ask me anything!

    SENIOR MEMBER
    Posted 01-18-2019 00:24
    Ganesan,

    Here's my answer.

    1. MDEA is combustible but is considered low (will burn at above 200F). Also when exposed to high temperatures/fire, it can degrade and produce Nitrogen Oxides, Carbon Monoxide, Carbon Dioxide, Hydrogen, etc. Also it spontaneously combust when exposed to hot fibrous insulation.

    One source: https://cameochemicals.noaa.gov/chemical/7103

    2. Depending on which vessel lost containment, pool fire scenario is not likely since MDEA is used to remove the H2S/CO2 from the sour gas/hydrocarbon that enters the in the contactor/absorber and hydrocarbon flashes overhead.

    Also it depends on whether the absorber is gas/liquid versus liquid/liquid. If gas which is common, the more likely hazards in this case is personnel exposure to H2S and Jetfire, or VCE if there is enough confinement and congestion. Pool fire is possible if it's a liquid to liquid absorber, but the pool fire is due to the liquid hydrocarbon and not the MDEA.

    Please let me know if you have any other questions.

    ------------------------------
    Michael Saura exidaFSP
    Founder
    SALTEGRA Consulting LLC
    ------------------------------



  • 32.  RE: Process Hazard Analysis Facilitator - Ask me anything!

    SENIOR MEMBER
    Posted 01-19-2019 07:07
    Dear all,

    As mentioned by Michael, MDEA has a low flammability but also a pool fire scenario of MDEA solution is unlikely because it is diluted in water around 40% - 60% wt. before to be used as acid gas removal agent.

    On the other hand, Rich MDEA solution can contain flammable compounds in the process, but after expansion to atmosphere most flammable gases will be desorbed from MDEA solution and a flammable cloud above MDEA could be generated. This flammable cloud could generate a flash fire (instantaneous with fast burn) but it should not be confused with pool fire.

    Regards.

    Leonardo Jiménez
    Senior Process Engineer

    ------------------------------
    Leonardo Jimenez Guerra
    Senior Process Engineer
    TECNICAS REUNIDAS
    Madrid
    ------------------------------



  • 33.  RE: Process Hazard Analysis Facilitator - Ask me anything!

    SENIOR MEMBER
    Posted 01-19-2019 07:29
    Michael, Jimenez,

    Thanks for the input.

    Considering that MDEA flammability is low and Rich MDEA has some hydrocarbons absorbed from the raw (feed) gas that is being treated, how will you approach a fire scenario in the Acid gas absorber?

    Is there a potential for pool fire?
    Is there enough quantity of fuel/hydrocarbon  available in the liquid phase?
    In addition, if there is a leak, will not the absorbed hydrocarbon be released as vapor ( as it happens, when the pressure is reduced in the flash vessel) and can cause jet fire?

    Your reply will be helpful.

    ------------------------------
    Ganesan Balaji
    Manager
    TC

    ------------------------------



  • 34.  RE: Process Hazard Analysis Facilitator - Ask me anything!

    SENIOR MEMBER
    Posted 01-25-2019 01:55
    Ganesan,

    I think we already explained the potential for pool fire. As Leonardo had pointed out, the "pool fire" is really a fire on top of the pool of MDEA, if it finds an ignition source.

    Your question on whether there is enough hydrocarbon available in the liquid phase can only be determined by your team since we do not have any information.

    If you have a leak above the liquid level line, then yes, there is potential for release of hydrocarbon and even H2S, which could cause jet fire or vapor cloud explosion depending on whether there is confinement and congestion, the quantity of the released material, and the process conditions.

    I hope this sheds some light.

    ------------------------------
    Michael Saura exidaFSP
    Founder
    SALTEGRA Consulting LLC
    Anaheim CA
    ------------------------------



  • 35.  RE: Process Hazard Analysis Facilitator - Ask me anything!

    SENIOR MEMBER
    Posted 01-27-2019 09:24
    Michael,

    Yes. You and Leonardo had responded to the MDEA flammability and the pool fire. Thanks for providing the detailed response and the subtle interpretation over the type of fire and the associated risks needed to be considered.

    Appreciate your willingness to share.

    Thanks

    Ganesan

    ------------------------------
    Ganesan Balaji
    Manager
    TC
    Beaumont TX
    ------------------------------



  • 36.  RE: Process Hazard Analysis Facilitator - Ask me anything!

    DIVISION DIRECTOR
    Posted 01-23-2019 02:21
    Hi Michael,

    I teach the capstone process design sequence at the University of Cincinnati. My student teams are required to do a PHA as part of their projects. They do what I think is a standard risk assessment accounting for likelihood, severity, and the performance of safeguards. With some coaching, I think my students do well with the likelihood and severity elements, and the PHA tool we use has some great reference information built in. Where we have trouble is quantifying the expected performance of safeguards.

    I've adopted, as an engineering standard for my courses, a short list of PFD values that ultimately come from Annex F of IEC 61511. This is a pretty short list -- certainly enough for an experienced team to use as a basis for determining the PFD values but often not enough for PHA beginners.

    My question is, are there any more extensive lists of typical PFD values that my relatively inexperienced teams can use in their PHAs?

    Thanks!

    Steve Thiel

    ------------------------------
    Stephen Thiel PE
    Professor Educator
    University of Cincinnati
    Cincinnati OH
    ------------------------------



  • 37.  RE: Process Hazard Analysis Facilitator - Ask me anything!

    SENIOR MEMBER
    Posted 01-23-2019 02:27
    Hi Stephen,

    If you find that the students are a bit inexperienced in using and understanding pfd values, you may use qualitative risk matrix which you can find ample samples of on internet.

    Also there are hse uk documents which give failure rates.

    Hope this helps.

    Regards,

    Sushant Chaturvedi.





  • 38.  RE: Process Hazard Analysis Facilitator - Ask me anything!

    DIVISION DIRECTOR
    Posted 01-23-2019 03:32
    Hi Sushant,

    Thanks for the suggestion about the HSE UK information, I'll check it out.

    Steve

    ------------------------------
    Stephen Thiel PE
    Professor Educator
    University of Cincinnati
    Montgomery OH
    ------------------------------



  • 39.  RE: Process Hazard Analysis Facilitator - Ask me anything!

    SENIOR MEMBER
    Posted 01-23-2019 02:48
    Stephen,

    Thanks for reaching out. It's good to know that more and more schools are adopting and exposing students to safety and risk analyses.

    First and foremost, it is advised to adopt a standard (CCPS LOPA Purple Book , published 2001, and best practice), which you already have (kudos to you), and be consistent with the usage. Constantly checking independent sources at least annually is good practice. 

    Now in terms of probability of failure on demand (PFD) values, 61511 is a good resource since these are fed by multiple credible entities such as SINTEF OREDA, Exida SERH, CCPS PERD, I also like using the CCPS Blue Book which provides PFDs and initiating event likelihood (IEL). These are amazing resources.

    In general, I start with my client's corporate standards if available since these are based on these resources already, plus years of the company's operating experience. And if there are causes and PFDs that are not available, we consult and agree on PFDs and IELs from these resources. 

    I hope this helps.

    --
    Michael Saura
    Process Safety & Risk Engineer
    msaura@saltegra.com | 7142991413







  • 40.  RE: Process Hazard Analysis Facilitator - Ask me anything!

    SENIOR MEMBER
    Posted 01-23-2019 02:52
    To Add: I like the fact that the book states qualifiers for the protection layers, to verify if the safeguard is truly and IPL and, depending on the IPL, what PFD or risk reduction factor (RRF) it can give.

    ------------------------------
    Michael Saura exidaFSP
    Founder
    SALTEGRA Consulting LLC
    Anaheim CA
    ------------------------------